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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ANIMALS
CATTLE.  The defendant had allowed
a third party to bring a heifer on to his
premises to use the defendant's butchering
equipment.  While the heifer was being
unloaded it got loose and in the process of
capturing the animal, the plaintiff was
injured.  The plaintiff sued under the
Animal Control Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 8,
¶ 351, claiming the defendant was liable
as an keeper of the heifer.  The court held
that the defendant was not a keeper of the
animal because the defendant exercised no
care, custody or control over a period of
time.  The plaintiff also claimed liability
under the Domestic Animals Running at
Large Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, ¶ 1, again
claiming that the defendant was a keeper of
the heifer.  The court also rejected this
argument in that the defendant never took
control of the heifer since it escaped before
entering on to the property.  Gahm v .
Cave, 551 N.E.2d 779 (Ill. App.
1990) .
BANKING
ACCELERATION OF LOAN.
Defendant bank received a check for the
sale of seed corn addressed to plaintiff
debtor and applied the full amount of
check plus the balance of the debtor's
checking account with bank towards loan
due almost seven months later.  The
debtor filed an action in tort for wrongful
negotiation of the check.  Under the loan
agreement, the bank had the right to
accelerate the loan if the bank deemed
itself unsecure as to the loan.  The court
upheld the trial court's finding that there
was substantial evidence to support the
bank's finding of insecurity in that the
debtor had a negative net worth.
Tolander v. Farmers Nat'l Bank,
452 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  Debtor had
received title to homestead under divorce
agreement which gave former spouse a
mortgage on payments to be made to the
spouse by the debtor.  The court held that
the mortgage was not avoidable as a
judicial lien because the lien was
consensual.  In re  McCormmach,
111 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. Or.
1990) .
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS.  The
foreclosure sale of the debtor's home at
69.5 percent of the fair market value was
not alone sufficient reason to set aside
foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer.
Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed.
Sav. and Loan, 111 B.R. 78 (E .D .
Pa. 1990), vac'g and rem'g 1 0 4
B.R. 688 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
DISCHARGE.  The debtor was a
corporation which had obtained a
confirmed plan in a voluntary Chapter 11
case which provided for deferred payment
of federal taxes.  The debtor failed to pay
the taxes due under the plan and a
subsequent Chapter 11 case was filed.
IRS argued that its unpaid claims from the
first case retained their priority status in
the second case.  The court held that under
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1), a corporate debtor
is discharged by the confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan from all claims which
arose before confirmation, including
federal taxes.  Thus, the IRS had only a
general unsecured claim.  Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors
v. U.S., 111 B.R. 158 (N.D. I l l .
1990), rev'g and rem'g 103 B . R .
177 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAY-
MENTS FOR TAXES.   Allocation of
Chapter 13 plan payments to pay taxes of
most recent years first not allowed because
payment of taxes under Chapter 13 plan
was involuntary. In re  Davis, 1 1 1
B.R. 234 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).
TAX LIENS.  Debtors received a
discharge of  federal taxes in Chapter 7.
The court held that the tax liens against
the debtor's property were not extinquished
by the discharge and remained valid after
discharge.  In re  Isom, 90 -1
U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,216 (9th Cir .
1990), aff'g 95 B.R. 148 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1989).
WITHHOLDING TAXES.  The
president and chief operating officer of the
debtor corporation operated the business
post-petition until replaced by the trustee.
During this time, the president withheld
employment taxes and placed the funds in
the debtor's general operating account.
The trustee was unaware that the general
operating account contained the withheld
amounts and the trustee spent all of the
account on other operating expenses.
After the IRS assessed the president the
100 percent penalty for failing to pay the
withheld taxes, the president brought an
action against the trustee for breach of
duty and contribution for failure to pay the
withheld taxes.  The court held that
because the taxes were incurred post-
petition, the taxes were not held in trust
but were part of the estate property and
subject to payment under the
administrative expenses priorities.  In
addition, the court held that the funds were
not held in trust because the funds were
not segregated from the general operating
funds.  Thus, the trustee did not breach
any duty to apply the funds to payment of
taxes.  In re Major Dynamics, Inc. ,
897 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1990) ,
aff'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g 5 9
B.R. 687 (Bankr. S. D. Cal .
1985) .
CONTRACTS
TIMBER.  Plaintiffs sold to the
defendants "all timber standing, lying,
growing and being" on certain timberland
with the total payment based on the
estimated number of cords available on the
land.  The contract specified that the
defendants had 24 months to remove the
timber; after such time the remaining
timber reverted back to the plaintiffs.  The
defendants did not remove all of the timber
during the 24 months and paid the
plaintiffs only for the wood removed.  The
court held that because the contract
conveyed all of the wood to the defendants
and identified the quantity of wood
involved in the contract price, the
defendants were required to pay the full
contract price even though they did not
remove all of the wood.  Chavers v .
Kent Diversified Products, Inc. ,
389 S.E.2d 261 (Ga. App. 1989).
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FARM CREDIT
SYSTEM
FEDERAL FARM CREDIT
BANKS FUNDING
CORPORATION.  The FFCBFC
brought an action under the Administrative
Procedures Act(APA) against the Farm
Credit Administration (FCA) for improper
issuance of Accounting Bulletin 89-2
which required FCSIC to list amounts
held in the FFCBFC insurance fund as an
expense instead of as a restricted asset as
was the practice of FFCBFC before
issuance of AB 89-2.  The FFCBFC and
FCA disagreed as to which method was in
keeping with GAAP.  The court held that
AB 89-2 was not an interpretative
regulation but was substantive and FCA
was required by the APA to give prior
notice of the rulemaking and an
opportunity for public comment.
Therefore, AB 89-2 was invalid.  Federal
Farm Credit Banks Funding Corp.
v. Farm Credit Admin., 7 3 1
F.Supp. 217 (E.D. Va. 1990).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ALIEN AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS.  The Secretaries of
Agricultural and Labor have announced
that Office of Management and Budget has
approved the paperwork requirements of
the final rules governing appeals of the
determination of the number of additional
aliens who may be admitted to fill a
shortage of agricultural workers.  The
appeal rules became effective upon
approval of the OMB on April 17, 1990.
55 Fed. Reg. 14231 (Apr. 1 7 ,
1990) .
CITRUS .  APHIS has issued a
proposed rule allowing certain movements
of untreated oranges, tangerines and
grapefruit from Mexico through
Galveston, Texas for import.  55 Fed.
Reg. 15232 (Apr. 23, 1990).
CROP INSURANCE .  The FCIC
has issued proposed regulations adding
procedures and requirements for
nonstandard assigned yields for
determining federal crop insurance
premium rates.  55 Fed. Reg. 17276
(Apr. 24, 1990), adding 7 C . F . R .
§ 400.301 et seq.
EXPORT PROGRAMS .  The
CCC has issued proposed regulations
governing the payment of bonuses in
connection with the export of agricultural
commodities under the Export
Enhancement Program.  55 Fed. R e g .
17443 (Apr. 25, 1990).
The CCC has issued proposed
regulations amending the Targeted Export
Assistance program regulations to
incorporate requirements previously found
only in TEA agreements and guidelines.
55 Fed. Reg. 17618 (Apr. 2 6 ,
1990), amending 7 C.F.R. Part
1485 .
MILK.  The AMS has adopted as a
final rule the removal of the plant location
adjustment provision from the marketing
orders for upper Florida, Tampa Bay and
southeastern Florida marketing areas.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 17589 (Apr. 26, 1990).
PEANUTS .  The AMS has issued a
proposed rule increasing the assessment on
peanuts under Marketing Agreement 146
for 1990-91 crop year to $0.52 per ton.
55 Fed. Reg. 14096 (Apr. 1 6 ,
1990) .
SWINE.  The APHIS has issued a
proposed rule removing Indiana and
Maryland from the list of states which
permit feeding of treated garbage to swine.
Alaska was removed from the list of states
which issue garbage treating licenses under
agreement with APHIS.  55 Fed. R e g .
15236 (Apr. 23, 1990).
VIRUSES, SERUMS AND
TOXINS.  The APHIS has issued
proposed rules for data requirements for the
use of autogenous biologics.  55 Fed.
Reg. 15233 (Apr. 23, 1990).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS.  At the decedent's
death, property from the decedent's
predeceased spouse's residuary trust passed
by testamentary power of appointment
exercised by the decedent to  grandchildren
along with the corpus of a trust
established by the decedent.  The
grandchildren were ruled to have effective
disclaimers of a fractional interest in real
estate under the decedent's trust and the
property passed by way of the decedent's
power of appointment.  Ltr. R u l .
9014005, Dec. 22, 1989.
After suffering a stroke, the surviving
spouse of the decedent executed a power of
attorney appointing two sons as attorneys-
in-fact which was not be affected by the
surviving spouse's subsequent disability or
incapacity.  Before the surviving spouse's
death, the sons executed disclaimers of the
surviving spouse's interest in two trusts
received from the decedent under the
decedent's will.  IRS held that because the
power of attorney was a durable power of
attorney under state law, the disclaimers
were effective for federal estate tax
purposes.  Ltr. Rul. 9015017, Jan.
10, 1990.
GENERATION SKIPPING
TRANSFERS .  The decedent held at
death a power of appointment of an
irrevocable trust established by the will of
the decedent's predeceased spouse.  The
trust was irrevocable on September 25,
1985.  IRS ruled that the exercise of the
power of appointment did not postpone or
suspend the vesting of any interest in the
trust and that the trust was not subject to
generation skipping transfer tax.  Ltr.
Rul. 9014005, Dec. 22, 1989
GIFTS WITHIN THREE
YEARS OF DEATH.  The decedent
had established a revocable trust with the
decedent as sole income beneficiary.  The
decedent also had the power to direct the
trustee to pay trust principal as the
decedent directed.  At the decedent's death,
the trust property passed to trusts for the
decedent's surviving spouse or members of
the decedent's family.  The decedent
directed the trustee to distribute trust
corpus to individuals within three years of
the decedent's death.  IRS ruled that the
trust property was includible in the
decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2038
because the decedent held the power at
death to amend or revoke the trust.  IRS
also ruled that the distributions directed by
the decedent from the trust were
relinquishments of the decedent's right to
revoke the trust as to the property
transferred and therefore each distribution
was a gift by reason of a termination of
the decedent's right to revoke the trust and
was subject to I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1).
Because the pre-death distributions would
have been includible in the decedent's
gross estate under section 2038, the
distributions were includible in the
decedent's gross estate.  IRS rejected the
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estate's arguments that (1) because the
decedent exercised so much control over
the trust assets, the pre-death distributions
should be considered as having been made
directly from the decedent, (2) the trustee
was only acting as an agent for the
decedent and (3) the distributions were
subject to inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2041 (retained power
of appointment) and not section 2038.
IRS noted that section 2041 does not
apply if the decedent's interest in property
is includible in the estate under section
2038.  Ltr. Rul. 9015001, Dec. 2 9 ,
1989 .
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT
OF ESTATE TAX .  Decedent held a
one-third beneficial interest in a trust
which owned timber land.  The trustee, an
independent bank, had general powers to
mange and invest the trust property
subject to requirements that the trustee
consult with the beneficiaries regarding
management of the timber land.  One of
the beneficiaries, a brother of the decedent,
also owned half of a management
company which provided services to the
trustee in managing the timber land and
marketing of timber harvested.  IRS ruled
that the decedent's interest in the trust
would be treated as an interest in a joint
venture with the trustee and brother of the
decedent acted as agents for the decedent in
managing the timber land.  Because the
decedent shared in the income and risks of
the enterprise, the decedent's interest in the
trust qualified as an interest in a closely
held business for purposes of installment
payment of estate tax.  Ltr. R u l .
9015003, Dec. 22, 1989.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The
estate was not allowed a marital deduction
where the estate tax return failed to
identify the life income interest passing to
the surviving spouse and the box for
making the election was marked "no."
Est. of Higgins v. Comm'r, 8 9 7
F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1990), aff'g 9 1
T.C. 61 (1989).
TRANSFERS WITH
RETAINED INTERESTS.  The
grantor had established a five year trust in
which the grantor's spouse was trustee and
the grantor was the sole income
beneficiary.  The grantor proposed to
amend the trust to make an unrelated party
trustee and to relinquish the power to
appoint seven-eighths of the trust property
if the grantor died after the trust had been
in effect for one year but before the trust
terminated.  IRS ruled that the
relinquishment of the power to appoint
seven-eighths of the trust property was a
gift if the grantor dies before the trust
terminates and that as amended, the
grantor's interest in the trust was a
qualified trust income interest such that
when the trust terminates after five years,
the grantor will not be considered to have
made a gift either as of the date of the
relinquishment of the power to appoint
seven-eighths of the trust property or upon
termination of the trust.  Ltr. R u l .
9012034, Dec. 21, 1989.
The grantor had established a trust in
which the grantor was trustee and received
the income from the trust for the earlier of
thirteen years or the grantor's death.  If the
grantor died before thirteen years, the trust
corpus reverted to the grantor's estate.
After thirteen years the trust corpus would
pass to the grantor's sons.  The grantor
reported and paid gift tax on the transfer.
The grantor later amended the trust to (1)
make the sons cotrustees, (2) decrease the
length of the trust to ten years, (3)
decrease the grantor's reversionary interest
to one-fourteenth after five years, and (4)
allow the replacement of trust corpus with
productive property.  IRS ruled that the
reduction in the length of the trust and the
reduction in the reversionary interest after
five years were taxable gifts.  The trust
was ruled a "qualified trust income
interest" and if the grantor survives the
trust, the grantor would not be treated as
having made a gift after five years or when
the trust terminates after ten years.  Ltr.
Rul. 9012057, Dec. 27, 1989.
The grantor had established an
irrevocable ten year trust with S
corporation stock as corpus and the grantor
as sole income beneficiary.  The common
stock of the S corporation is to be reissued
in equal parts as voting and nonvoting
shares.  IRS ruled that because the value
of the grantor's reversionary interest did
not exceed 25 percent of the value of the
income interest, the grantor will not be
considered to have retained the enjoyment
of the nonvoting stock transferred to the
trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9015024, Jan. 1 1 ,
1990 .
TRUSTS .  A shareholder of an S
corporation transferred common stock to
an irrevocable trust for ten years with the
shareholder as sole income beneficiary.
The shareholder had the power to require
replacement of unproductive trust property
with productive property.  If the
shareholder dies before ten years, the trust
corpus passes to the shareholder's estate.
After ten years, the trust corpus is
distributed in trust to another person.  The
common stock of the S corporation is to
be reissued in equal parts as voting and
nonvoting shares.  IRS ruled that the
shareholder would be treated as the owner
of the trust and that the trust was a
qualified subchapter S trust.  IRS also
ruled that because the termination of the
shareholder's interest in the trust was
subject to conditions, the shareholder's
death or ten years, beyond the shareholder's
control, the transfer of the stock to the
trust was subject to federal gift tax in the
year of the transfer.  The value of the gift
depended upon the shareholder's exercise of
the power to require the trust property to
be productive.  Ltr. Rul. 9015024 ,
Jan. 11, 1990.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS.  Taxpayer purchased
a 49 percent interest in a corporation
owning a car sales business.  The taxpayer
purchased the interest in order to
rehabilitate the business and resell the
business to the other stockholder at a
profit.  During the course of business, the
taxpayer loaned money to the corporation
which was entered as a loan on the
corporate books and for which notes were
issued.  The court held that the loss on the
loans when the business went out of
business was a deductible bad debt loss
where the court found that the taxpayer
was in the business of buying businesses
with the intent to resell them for a profit.
In re  Farrington, 111 B.R. 3 4 2
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
COST-SHARE PAYMENTS .
IRS ruled that the payments received by a
lessor of property under the Watershed
Protection and Flood Prevention Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) were excludible
from gross income of the lessor.  Ltr.
Rul. 9014041, Jan. 5, 1990.
DEPRECIATION.  IRS ruled that
unless the taxpayer elects not to use the
MACRS, the class life and recovery
periods of Rev. Rul. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B.
674 must be used.  If the taxpayer elects
out of MACRS, the amount of
depreciation may be based on the number
of hours the depreciated assets were used
during the taxable year but cannot exceed,
during the first two-thirds of the property's
useful life, the total allowance permitted
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under the declining balance method.  Ltr.
Rul. 9015014, Jan. 9, 1990.
INFORMATION RETURNS.
IRS has announced proposed regulations
governing the reporting of real estate
transactions which will replace the
existing temporary regulations on January
1, 1991.  The proposed regulations will
apply the reporting requirements to all
transfers of present and future interests in
(1) improved and unimproved land,
including air space; (2) inherently
permanent structures, including any
residential, commercial or industrial
building; (3) condominium units; and (4)
stock in a cooperative housing
corporation.  Exempted from the
requirements are (1) transactions which are
not sales or exchanges; (2) foreclosures;
(3) transfers in which the total
consideration received is less than $250;
and (4) transfers of surface or subsurface
natural resources, crops, burial plots, and
unaffixed mobile homes.  The rules
governing determination of the "reporting
person" are generally unchanged from the
previous regulations, which are effective
until December 31, 1990.  55 Fed.
Reg. 14429 (Apr. 18, 1990)
adding Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.6045-4 .
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.
A noncorporate lessor was not allowed
investment tax credit on leased property
where, under the circumstances, the lease
was intended to be indefinite.  Crockett
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-
201 .
IRS was denied a summary judgment
where although some elements of a lack of
a profit motive, under I.R.C. § 183, were
shown, there were genuine issues of fact
as to other elements.  Thomas v .
U.S., 90-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 5 0 , 2 0 8
(E.D. Mo. 1990).
IRA'S.  Taxpayer was a non-spouse
beneficiary of an IRA owned by another
individual.  IRS ruled that the entire
amount of a rollover of funds from the
individual's IRA at the death of the
individual was taxable to the taxpayer.
Ltr. Rul. 9014071, Jan. 12, 1990.
LIFE INSURANCE .  A
corporation transferred life insurance
policies on the corporation's two
shareholders to a partnership in which the
shareholders were the sole partners in
payment of rent owed to the partnership
for leasing of operating facilities.  The
policies named the corporation as
beneficiary.  The beneficiary on each
policy will be the other partner.  IRS ruled
that the transfer is excludible from income
under Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(3)(ii)
because the transfer involves the transfer
to a partnership of the insured.  Ltr.
Rul. 9012063, Dec. 28, 1989.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES.  IRS
has issued proposed regulations governing
the federal income tax treatment of
exchanges of personal property and
exchanges of multiple properties.
The general rule is that the
nonrecognition rules of I.R.C. § 1031 do
not apply to an exchange of one kind or
class of property for property of a different
kind or class.
Like-kind property classes .
Under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2,
depreciable personal property held for use
in a business is of the same class if within
the same General Business Asset Class as
described in Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2
C.B. 674 or the same Product Class.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(b)(2) also
lists the General Business Asset Classes.
Properties are in the same product class if
they have the same five digit product code
in the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 1987 Census of
Manufacturers and Census of Mineral
Industries, 1989 Reference Series:
Numerical List of Manufactured and
Mineral Products (Feb. 1989).  If the
depreciable tangible personal property does
not have a product code or is listed under a
miscellaneous product code, the
determination of the class is based on all
facts and circumstances.
Intangible personal property,
nondepreciable personal property and
property held for investment are
determined to be of a like-kind depending
upon the type of right involved and on the
type of underlying property to which the
property relates.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(a)-2(c).
Exchanges of multiple
properties.  In an exchange involving
several properties, the properties must first
be separated into properties eligible for
like-kind exchange treatment and those
ineligible.  The eligible properties must
then be segregated into exchange groups
consisting of properties of the same
business asset class or product class.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(f)-1(b)(2)(i).
Liabilities assumed by the taxpayer are
to be offset by the liabilities from which
the taxpayer is relieved in the exchange.
Excess liabilities assumed by the taxpayer
are allocated to the exchange groups based
on the fair market value of the groups.
Excess relieved liabilities are allocated to
money or property not subject to the
nonrecognition rules.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(f)-1(b)(2)(ii), (iii).
In the exchange of the properties in
each exchange group, after allocation of
liabilities, gain is recognized to the extent
the aggregate fair market of the properties
in the received exchange group exceed the
aggregate fair market value of the
properties transferred.  Losses are not
recognized.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(f)-1(b)(2)(iv).
The aggregate basis of the properties in
each exchange group is the aggregate basis
of the properties transferred plus the gain
recognized for the exchange of the
properties in that group.  The aggregate
basis is then allocated to each property in
the group based upon the pro rata fair
market value of the properties.  Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(f)-1(c).
The proposed regulations contain
several examples illustrating the above
rules.  55 Fed. Reg. 17635 (Apr.
26, 1990), adding Prop. Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.1031(a)-2, 1.1031(f)-1.
An owner of an oil and gas lease sold
the lease to a petroleum company and
negotiated the purchase of a farm from a
land trust.  The petroleum company had
paid cash ernest money for the lease and
the taxpayer had provided the land trust
with some money to purchase the farm
and had begun farming the land.  The
parties then attempted to restructure the
transactions to have the petroleum
company exchange the farm for the oil and
gas lease.  The court held that although
the parties are generally able to structure
such agreements for tax purposes, the
transactions had already been substantially
implemented prior to the restructuring and
a like-kind exchange of property had not
occurred for income tax purposes.  Est .
of Alexander v. Comm'r, 94 T . C .
No. 34 (1990).
PARTNERSHIPS
CONTRIBUTIONS.  A limited
partnership was proposed in which the fair
market value of the property transferred to
the partnership in marketable securities
was 62.13 percent of the total partnership
property.  The remaining property was
timber and timberland and timber cutting
rights.  The timber cutting rights would
be reduced to cash within one year of
partnership formation.  IRS ruled that the
partnership was not an investment
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company and that the contribution of
property to the partnership was a
nontaxable transaction.  Ltr. R u l .
9013016, Dec. 22, 1989.
PENALTIES.  IRS has adopted as
final regulations involving the abatement
of penalties and additions to tax
attributable to erroneous advice received
from an officer or employee of IRS acting
in an official capacity.  The proposed
regulations were published at 54 Fed. Reg.
21073 (May 16, 1989).  55 Fed. R e g .
14244 (Apr. 17, 1990), adding
Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-3.
RESIDENTIAL ENERGY
CREDIT.  The taxpayers were not
allowed a residential energy credit for
water-to-air heat pump system because the
system derived its heat from geothermal
heated water and not from solar heated
water.  Newborn v. Comm'r, 9 4
T.C. No. 36 (1990).
S CORPORATIONS
BUILT-IN GAINS.  An S corporation
had a short taxable year for its first taxable
year as an S corporation.  IRS ruled that
the short taxable year counted as a taxable
year for purposes of the tax on built-in net
capital gains under I.R.C. § 1374(a).
Ltr. Rul. 9015040, Jan. 12, 1990.
RE-ELECTION.  An S corporation
had revoked its S corporation election.
After just over three years, all of the stock
of the corporation was sold to persons
unrelated to the original shareholder.  IRS
allowed the new shareholder to re-elect S
corporation status within five years of the
revocation.  Ltr. Rul. 9015015, Jan.
9, 1990.
TRUSTS.  Shares of an S corporation
stock were transferred in trust by the
decedent's will to the surviving spouse as
sole income beneficiary for the spouse's
life.  The trust terminates upon the death
of the surviving spouse.  Although the
trust does not provide for any distribution
of trust principal until termination of the
trust, under local law, the only person
who could invade principal would be the
income beneficiary.  IRS ruled that the
trust was a qualified subchapter S trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9015043, Jan. 12, 1990.
A shareholder of an S corporation
transferred common stock to an irrevocable
trust for ten years with the shareholder as
sole income beneficiary.  The shareholder
had the power to require conversion of
unproductive trust property with
productive property.  If the shareholder
dies before ten years, the trust corpus
passes to the shareholder's estate.  After
ten years, the trust corpus is distributed in
trust to another person.  The common
stock of the S corporation is to be reissued
in equal parts as voting and nonvoting
shares.  IRS ruled that the shareholder
would be treated as the owner of the trust
and that the trust was a qualified
subchapter S trust.  Ltr. R u l .
9015024, Jan. 11, 1990.
The grantor established an irrevocable
trust for a grandchild consisting of stock
of an S corporation.  The trustee is to
distribute annually the net income of the
trust and has the discretion to distribute
trust principal for payment of the
beneficiary's share of tax on undistributed
income of the corporation.  IRS ruled that
the trust was a qualified subchapter S trust
and that undistributed S corporation
income is not trust income and is not
required by the trust instrument to be
distributed to the beneficiary.  Ltr. R u l .
9014031, Jan. 3, 1990.
Taxpayers successfully petitioned a
state court for reformation of a trust which
owned stock in a corporation to split the
trust into separate trusts for each
beneficiary and to make distribution of
trust income mandatory.  IRS ruled that
the reformed trusts were qualified
subchapter S trusts.  Ltr. R u l .
9014025, Jan. 3, 1990.
The owner of all the stock of an S
corporation transferred the nonvoting stock
to trusts for each child.  Upon the death of
a beneficiary, the trust corpus is to be
split into individual trusts for the
beneficiary's children.  The trustee is
required to pay trust income and principal
to the beneficiary.  If the trust does not
hold S corporation stock, the trustee is not
required to distribute trust income.  The
taxpayer proposes to have the trust income
paid to grantor trusts established by each
beneficiary.  IRS ruled that the trusts were
qualified subchapter S trusts so long as the
income is distributed currently but that the
trusts were not qualified subchapter S
trusts if trust income is distributed to
grantor trusts.  Ltr. Rul. 9014008 ,
Dec. 27, 1989.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST
RATES
MAY 1990
           Semi-
    Annual    annual     Quarterly       Monthly    
Short-term
        AFR  8.65     8.47   8.38      8.32
110%AFR  9.454    9.32   9.21      9.14
120%AFR 10.42   10.16 10.03      9.95
Mid-term
        AFR  8.81     8.62     8.53        8.47
110%AFR  9.70     9.48      9.37       9.30
120%AFR 10.61   10.34    10.21     10.12
Long-term
        AFR  8.74    8.56      8.47      8.41
110%AFR  9.64    9.42      9.31        9.24
120%AFR 10.53  10.27    10.14      10.06
INSURANCE
COVERAGE.  A neighboring
property owner filed an action against the
defendant for injunctive relief for the
defendant's closing of a section line by a
gate and for trespass on the neighbor's
private road.  The plaintiff insurance
company filed an action for declaratory
relief that it was not obligated to defend
the defendant insured because the property
insurance policies owned by the insured
did not cover intentional acts of the
insured.  The insured/defendant argued that
the insurance company was required to
make an independent investigation as to
whether the insured's acts were intentional.
The court ruled that the insurance
company could rely on the facts alleged in
the neighbor's complaint to determine
whether the insurance policy covered any
of the acts of the insured.  Because the
neighbor's complaint alleged only
intentional acts, closing of the section line
and trespass, the policy did not cover the
defendant insured and the insurance
company was not required to defend the
insured.  Also, the insurance company was
not required to defend the case because the
neighbor was not seeking any damages but
only injunctive relief.  National
Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. C o .
v. Kovash, 452 N.W.2d 307 (N.D.
1990) .
MORTGAGES
   REDEMPTION RIGHTS.  Debtors
had deeded title to farm land to lender in
lieu of foreclosure but advised the lender of
their desire to repurchase the land.  The
lender sold the land to third parties without
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giving the debtors notice or an
opportunity to first repurchase the
property as required under Iowa Code §
524.910(2).  The trial court held that the
lender had violated the debtors' rights under
the code but did not void the sale of the
land to the third parties on equitable
grounds.  The Supreme Court held that the
equities favored voiding the contract in
this case and required the sale of the land
to the debtors.  Decorah State Bank
v. Wangsness, 452 N.W.2d 4 3 8
(Iowa 1990).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
EASEMENTS .  The plaintiffs and
defendants each purchased a portion of a
farm on opposite sides of a road.  The
defendant's portion contained a sandpoint
and pump which operated on electricity
from the plaintiffs' property to supply
water to the plaintiffs' property.  After the
defendants disconnected and dismantled the
sandpoint and pump, the plaintiffs filed an
action arguing that the sandpoint and
pump were an implied easement.
Although acknowledging the case as a
close call, the court upheld the trial court's
finding of no easement because the water
from the sandpoint was not reasonably
necessary for the plaintiffs' property in
that other sources of water were available.
Hallock v. Wear, 551 N.E.2d 7 1 2
(Ill. App. 1990).
NAVIGABLE WATERS.  The
court held that a stream which flowed
through the defendant's property was not
open to public access because the stream
was not navigable.  The court found that
the stream was only passable by boat
during flooding of a nearby river and only
then for a short time.  Gollate v .
Harrell, 731 F. Supp. 453 ( S . D .
Ala. 1989).
STATE
REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
PESTICIDES.  The plaintiff
challenged a city ordinance which restricted
aerial spraying of pesticides as preempted
by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act.  The court held that
FIFRA preempted the city ordinance
because FIFRA allowed regulation of
pesticides only to the states, which under a
definition in FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136(aa),
did not include cities.  Mortier v .
Town of Casey, 452 N.W.2d 5 5 5
(Wis. 1990).
WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
EMPLOYEE STATUS .  Plaintiff
was hired by a farmer to drive the farmer's
truck in delivering grain for the grain
elevator defendant.  The farmer was to
receive payment according to the number
of bushels hauled for the elevator and the
plaintiff received a percentage of that
payment.  The only control over the driver
exercised by the grain elevator was where
the grain was to be delivered.  The number
of trips and the route taken were
discretionary with the driver.  The driver
was injured while making a delivery.  The
court held that the driver was not an
employee of the grain elevator because the
elevator did not have the right to control
how the driver did the job except for the
destination of the grain.  The court also
held that the driver was not an employee
of the elevator under the "lent employee"
theory for the same reason.  Bargery v .
Obion Grain Co., 785 S.W.2d 118
(Tenn. 1990).
CITATION
UPDATES
Gradow V. U.S., 897 F.2d 5 1 6
(9th Cir. 1990), aff'g 11 Cl. C t .
808 (1987) (community property in
gross estate).  See p. 80 supra.
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